Showing posts with label Industrial Organization (IO). Show all posts
Showing posts with label Industrial Organization (IO). Show all posts

Saturday, May 5, 2012

Mandatory Health Care – Not the solution




 
The problem is that there is too few doctors in the market.  The American Medical Association acts as an cartel by blocking entry into the market.

Doctor’s Total Value: Doctor’s Rent1+ Doctor’s Surplus1> Doctor’s Surplus0

Patient’s Total Value: Patient’s Surplus1 < Patient’s Surplus0

DEAD Weight Loss: This is the area represented by the medical treatments that did not happen because patients were unable or unwilling to pay for Price1.

NOTE*: The difference between Q* and Q1 might represent a huge difference as patients make decisions regarding their medical condition based on an inflated price.

 
This might look like a better outcome, but it is not.

Doctor’s Total Value: Doctor’s Surplus2 + Doctor’s Rent2 > Doctor’s Rent1 + Doctor’s Surplus1

Patient’s Total Value: Patient’s Surplus2 < Patient’s Surplus1

DEAD Weight Loss: Dead weight loss2 relative to dead weight loss 1.  We don’t know.  We do know that Q2>Q1. 

NOTE*: So, you ask? Why aren’t patients better off?  The problem lies in how and why the demand curve shifted out.  The demand curve shifted out because people are instead paying yearly premiums distributed across all health insurance consumers.  We know that there is no way on average people are going to receive more value from health insurance than they pay.  Therefore, though they pay less per treatment, on average people pay more for health services because of health insurance.

However, politicians observe people who receive health insurance through work and find these people to be very happy.  This is because for those people who receive health insurance through work, this is the equivalent to a lump sum transfer or payment.  So, politicians say, one way to make people happy is to give them health insurance.  Thus recent medical reform.



This might look like a better outcome, but it is not.

Doctor’s Total Value: Doctor’s Surplus3 + Doctor’s Rent3 > Doctor’s Rent2 + Doctor’s Surplus2

Patient’s Total Value: Patient’s Surplus3 < Patient’s Surplus2

DEAD Weight Loss: We cannot directly observe the dead weight loss in this graph.  However, if you keep in mind that the average commission by insurance companies is upwards of 20% (as high as 50%) of what you pay in premium then you can be pretty sure that all of that extra cost is not a good thing.

So, why is this a bad thing?  Q3 is close to Q4, it might even be greater.  So hopefully less people will die and live in discomfort because of lack of medical services.  Sure, people in general are unhappy with how much they pay for insurance but ultimately that is mostly a direct transfer to doctors which are much happier.  Is this a problem? 

Yes! Currently the US spends 13% of our GDP on health insurance.  This is 4 times as much as other national on the planet.  This rate is only growing as health insurance becomes mandatory.  Simultaneously a larger portion of the population is growing elderly which corresponds with much higher rates of illness and higher medical costs.  The status quo of many people being unable to afford health insurance is not ethically viable.  The alternative proposed of everybody receiving health insurance is not economically viable.

In what kind of a world do we live where a person could spend his/her entire life savings paying for a single operation that costs 2 to 10 people 5 hours of their lives? 

Review: Oligopoly Models

Cournot Competition:
Firms compete in quantity of output they put out.
Firms can either produce homogenous goods (beef) or heterogeneous goods (PCs)
Firms do not cooperate
Firms have market power
Firms choose quantity simultaneously: homogenous goods
firm 1: max(q1) { pi=q1(p(q1+q2)-c)}
firm 2: max(q2) { pi=q2(p(q1+q2)-c)}

Solve the FOC of the first equation with respect to q1(q2) then substitute it into equation 2.



Bertrand Competition:
Firms compete in price, not quantity.
Firms set prices simultaneously.
Consumers buy entirely from the firm with the lower price.
Result, both firms price at marginal cost (if they share the same cost structure).
If one firm has superior production technology and average cost is lower, that firm will charge just below what the other firm’s marginal cost and put the other one out of the market.


Stackelberg Competition
Leader follower model.
Compete in quantity.  Price is lower than Cournot price but higher than Bertrand price.
If compete in price then price at MC.  Because (P-MC)Q/2 is always less than (P-MC-epsilon)Q so long as P-MC>0 for some epsilon > 0.
Proof by contradiction: 
1) (P-MC)Q/2 >= (P-MC-epsilon)Q
2) (P-MC) >= 2(P-MC-epsilon)
3) 0 >= P-MC-epsilon 
4) epsilon >= P-MC
5) We already said that P-MC>0 if so then there must be a P-MC>epsilon>0 which is a contradiction of (4).  Thus 1 must not be true which means:
6) (P-MC)Q/2 < (P-MC-epsilon)Q