Tuesday, April 9, 2013

Tit for Tat - Axelrod tournament style competitive simulation


# I have been reading the Moral Animal by Robert Wright and it has gotten me interested in putting together a simulation which is modeled after the classic Robert Axelrod's tournament style influential simulations.  So here it is!  Hope you enjoy it.

# You can also find a link to the code in full here.

# I would like to simulate multi-agent a micro-economy in which agents perform the prisoner's dimemma repeatedly.

# Games like this have been important as evidence for an evolutionary psychological explanation of social cooperation.
See how differing strategies
perform against each other

# Returns for:
  # cooperate
  coop.coop = 1

  # you cheat but opponent cooperates
  cheat.coop = 2

  # You cooperate but opponent cheats
  coop.cheat = -2

  # Both cheat
  cheat.cheat = -1

# This function turns the parameters into returns.
returns = function(you,opponent) {
  ret = 0*you
  ret[(you==1)&(opponent==1)] = coop.coop
  ret[(you==0)&(opponent==1)] = cheat.coop
  ret[(you==1)&(opponent==0)] = coop.cheat
  ret[(you==0)&(opponent==0)] = cheat.cheat
  ret
}

# For example, if you cheat but your opponent cooperates for the first two rounds
returns(c(0,0,0),c(1,1,0))

# Thus the game is defined as a zero sum game when players interact randomly with each other.  But a greater than zero sum when players are systematically cooperating and less than zero sum when players are systematically cheating.

# Number of rounds:
  n.rounds = 200

# Number of agents. This number must be even to ensure every agent is matched.
  n.agents = 20

# Basic framework.
# Each round agents meet other agents.
# Each agent has access to knowledge of the other agents previous behavior (either cheat or cooperate)

# Let's define the types of agents.
# Agents get fed input h which is the list of prior history with other agent.
# The argument they return is their action.

# The stupid agents are.
always.coop  = function(h) 1
always.cheat = function(h) 0

# Random Tod
Random.Tod = function(h) 1==rbinom(1,1,.5)

# tit4tat says that if the most recent action the opponent took was cheat then cheat otherwise cooperate.
tit4tat = function(h) {
  # When the length of h = 0 then that means there is no history.
  if (length(h)==0) T
  else rev(h)[1]==1
}

# initially agressive tit4tat
ag.tit4tat = function(h) {
  if (length(h)==0) F
  else rev(h)[1]==1
}

# opportunist tit4tat
op.tit4tat = function(h) {
  if (length(h)==0) T
  else ((n  # This is a somewhat tricky action behavior.
  # It states that play tit for tat up to the point near when the game ends.
  # Then start cheating because the game is coming to an end.
}


# fairbot is defined such that fairbot will only cheat if on average the previous actions the opponent cheated more
fairbot = function(h) {
  if (length(h)==0) T
  else mean(h,na.rm=T)>=.5
}

# Initially agressive fair bot
ag.fairbot = function(h) {
  if (length(h)==0) F
  else mean(h,na.rm=T)>=.5
}

# Coward dictator. If opponent on average cooperates then cheat, if opponent on average cheats then cooperate.
dictator = function(h) {
  if (length(h)==0) T
  else mean(h,na.rm=T)<=.5
}

# Aggressive dictator
ag.dictator = function(h) {
  if (length(h)==0) F
  else mean(h,na.rm=T)<=.5
}

# Frenemy
frenemy = function(h) {
  if (length(h)==0) T
  else mean(rev(h)[1:2],na.rm=T)==1
  # Frienemy is friendly until you have two interactions in which you cooperate with it then it cheats before turning friendly again if you cooperate twice then it turns ugly again.
}

agent.list = c("always.coop", "always.cheat", "tit4tat" , "ag.tit4tat",
               "fairbot"    , "ag.fairbot"  , "dictator", "ag.dictator",
               "op.tit4tat" , "Random.Tod"  , "frenemy")
             
# First I will draw a random draw of agents.
agents = sort(sample(agent.list, n.agents, replace=T))

# Now let's generate the agent history matrices for each player.
agent.number = matrix(NA, ncol=n.agents, nrow=n.rounds)

# The agent actions matrices are
agent.actions.recieved = matrix(NA, ncol=n.agents, nrow=n.rounds)
agent.actions.given = matrix(NA, ncol=n.agents, nrow=n.rounds)

# Agent point history (the total is the sum of the columns)
agent.points = matrix(NA, ncol=n.agents, nrow=n.rounds)

# Let's start the simulation:
n = 1
for (n in 1:n.rounds) {

  # This while loop ensures that every agent is matched with another agent
  while (sum(is.na(agent.number[n,]))>0) {
  # In each round each agents gets randomly paired up with another agent.
  unpaired = 1:n.agents

    # Loop through all of the agents
    while (length(unpaired)>1) {
      # Select the first element of the unpaired list as a starting place.
      i = unpaired[1]
      # Remove agent i from the unpaired list
      unpaired = unpaired[unpaired!=i]
      # This randomly selects a single agent to match i to.
        # I threw the repeate function in there because when unpaired gets down to
        # only a single number in length then sample starts functioning differently.
        # Thus the rep keeps it from ever being length 1.
      i.match = sample(rep(unpaired,2), 1)
      # Remove i.match from unpaired list
      unpaired = unpaired[unpaired!=i.match]
      # Assign to agent i and i.match their match values
      agent.number[n,i] = i.match
      agent.number[n,i.match] = i
    } # This loop matches agents
  }
  # There should be no NAs in this list if the previous matching loops worked properly.
  sort(agent.number[n,])
 
  for (i in 1:n.agents) {
    # Define each agent's history from previous encounters with the current counterpart
    a.faced = agent.number[n,i]
    a.numbers = agent.number[,i]
    a.actions = agent.actions.recieved[,i]
 
    # Select h as the history of actions with the current rival
    # excluding this round.
    h = a.actions[(a.numbers==a.faced)&(n>1:n.rounds)]
 
 
 
    # Feed history into response function
    response = get(agents[i])(h)
    print(h)
    print(response)

    # Save the response to the actions
    agent.actions.given[n,i] = response
    agent.actions.recieved[n,a.faced] = response
 
    # print(i)
  }
 
}

# Calculate scores by round:
scores.round = returns(agent.actions.given, agent.actions.recieved)

# Final results are:
cbind(agents,apply(scores.round, 2, sum))

# Let's map out the social networks inherent in this exchange:
require(igraph)

# Let's first create out edge list
# Specify a number less than the total number of rounds to map since the total number of rounds is probably a little too large.
map.rounds = 7

x = cbind(1:n.agents, agent.number[1,])
for (n in 2:map.rounds) {
  x = rbind(x, cbind(1:n.agents, agent.number[n,]))
}

# We will use the statnet package to plot the social network
require(statnet)
g = network(x)

plot(g, label=agents, main="A social network graph does not help")




# A better graph might be one that shows how different agents performed over time.
score.cum = apply(scores.round, 2, cumsum)

agent.color = rainbow(length(agent.list))

plot(x=c(1,n.rounds+25),y=c(min(score.cum),max(score.cum)),type="n",
     main="AI performance over time", xlab="round", ylab="score")
for (i in 1:n.agents) lines(1:n.rounds, score.cum[,i], col=agent.color[agents[i]==agent.list], lwd=2)

# Reorder agents by lowest to highest cumscore at the end
agents.ranked = agents[order(score.cum[n.rounds,])]

yrange = max(score.cum)-min(score.cum)
yinc = (yrange/n.agents)
for (i in 1:n.agents) text(n.rounds+17.5, yinc*i+min(score.cum)-2.5, paste(n.agents-i+1,agents.ranked[i]), col=agent.color[agents.ranked[i]==agent.list])

# Each time you run the simulation you get different results depending upon the random draws and the agents in the pool.  Experiment with what happens as the size of the pool increases.  Cooperative strategies loose out to aggressive strategies.

# We can see that up to between round 50-80 all of the bots perform equally since they do not have any history on each other.

# Notice that the opportunistic tit4tat seems to perform the best frequently.  This is kind of unfair since this bot is using meta-game data.  That is, it knows the game is nearly ended so it starts cheating like crazy because there is probably not time for future reprisals.

1 comment :

  1. See also Douglas Hofstadter, "Metamagical Themas", chapter 29, in which he conducted a similar tournament some years ago (not using R, because R didn't exist then!)

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